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BOOK REVIEWS
The Givenness of Things. Robinson, Marilynne. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015. 304pp.
ISBN: 978-0374298470. Reviewed by Walker Cosgrove, Associate Professor of History, Dordt College.
Toward the end of October a good friend of
mine emailed me a link to an article regarding
a conversation between President Obama and
professor and writer Marilynne Robinson, in
which President Obama interviewed Robinson.1
The text of his email said jokingly that this
article revealed that she had become “the high
priestess of America.” My response was that we
could do a whole lot worse than her, since she is
thoughtful, articulate, learned, and supportive
of the traditional arts and sciences in higher
education. After reading her new book of essays,
The Givenness of Things, I am further convinced
that Robinson is quite sympathetic to intellectuals
and writers, particularly those of a religious bent,
who remain rooted in knowledge and education
as historically conceived and have not embraced
every educational fad of the past twenty years. She
has little time for much of the nonsense that occurs
in public, civic, and educational spheres. Her
nonfiction has done much to shape my thinking
in many areas, and this new volume furthers that
influence.
Her magisterial fiction aside (her novels have
won numerous awards, including the Pulitzer for
Gilead), Robinson is a rare writer and intellectual
today. To say she is learned and erudite would
be obvious, but she wears this learnedness
comfortably. Furthermore, she is a renaissance
woman of sorts, dabbling not just in the world of
her doctoral scholarship (Shakespeare) or teaching
(creative writing), but easily conversant in theology,
history, philosophy, political science, and the hard
sciences, particularly physics. Moreover, she is a
woman of faith, a subject she does not shy from
at all. Unlike many celebrated writers and artists
of faith, Robinson is an unabashed Calvinist, not
the theological camp one joins to win friends and
influence people.
Robinson’s nonfiction is best categorized as two
different types. The first type, books that meditate
on a universal whole, includes Mother Country and

Absence of Mind. What I mean by universal whole
is that each volume takes up a common, dominant
theme. Mother Country is an extended essay over
250 pages regarding the British welfare state and
nuclear waste, and Absence of Mind is a series of
lectures on religion and science, her attempt to
restore the primacy of human consciousness into
conversations between the two. The second type
of nonfiction she writes is looser and more freewheeling, including collections of occasional
pieces such as The Death of Adam and When I Was
a Child. The Givenness of Things fits into this latter
type, a characteristic that makes doing it justice
in a review more difficult. Because I cannot touch
upon every essay in a brief review, I will highlight a
couple of persistent themes in this new book.
Something I most appreciate about Robinson’s
nonfiction is her persistent critique of what
she elsewhere (in The Absence of Mind) calls
“parascience.” She defines this term as a theory
which bases its claims about the world, humanity,
and ultimate reality upon nineteenth-century
positivistic notions of science as extolled by
Auguste Comte, though she clearly demonstrates
that these claims are not scientific in the least, but
instead metaphysical.2 Her criticism of parascience
is stronger for her profound respect of true science
displayed across her nonfiction, including this
newest volume.3 And while she is justly critical
of this theory masquerading as science, she
frequently extols the “achievements and insights”
that science has brought over the past hundred
or so years (4-5). The main focus of her criticism
of parascience, especially in this volume on
neuroscience, is that it operates with a model of
reality that is reductionistic, based ultimately in
positivism ([73ff]; she even compares parascience
with religious literalism and religious liberalism
[see 167, 211]). To Robinson, this reductionism
leads to an unwillingness to consider the depth of
mystery that surrounds the mind and personhood;
as she writes, “Neuroscientists seem predisposed to
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the conclusion that there is no ‘self ’…. The real
assertion being made in all this (neuroscience is
remarkable among the sciences for its tendency
to bypass hypothesis and even theory and to go
directly to assertion) is that there is no soul” (8).
She points to Alexis de Tocqueville as a prophetic
voice, who connected the view of “progress” in
his own day and the eventual reduction of the
human to mere material (75). Let me be clear,
however. This is not a criticism of true science and
its search for knowledge and truth: “If there is a
scientific mode of thought that is crowding out
and demoralizing the humanities, it is not research
in the biology of the cell or the quest for life on
other planets” (12).
The antidote to this materialist reductionism,
for Robinson, is found in the arts and humanities,
which help us better explore, process, and
understand the human experience in all of its
complexity, diversity, and uniqueness (10-11, 118119). Regarding the mysteriousness of the human
mind, she writes, “If Shakespeare had undergone
an MRI there is no reason to believe there would
be any more evidence of extraordinary brilliance in
him than there would be of a self or a soul. He left
a formidable body of evidence that he was both
brilliant and singular, but it has fallen under the
rubric of Renaissance drama and is somehow not
germane, perhaps because this places the mind
so squarely at the center of the humanities” (11).
True science, she is right to emphasize, welcomes
and embraces mystery, as can be seen in the recent
developments in a variety of fields in which what
we know continues to grow, but these fields
humbly acknowledge what we do not know as well.
Not so for parascience, which assumes that we can
know all that is knowable and that mystery will be
dispelled; both assumptions are limited ideas that
are dangerously reductionistic in defining what
“human” is (14, 230).
In light of this emphasis on the arts and
humanities, I find curious Robinson’s praises of the
philosophy of pragmatism in general and William
James in particular (73ff). I am well aware of my
own lack of knowledge regarding pragmatism as
a philosophy and James as one of its principle
practitioners, so I tread lightly in my criticism
here. Part of the problem may be that I am
unfamiliar with ideas within pragmatism to which
she is drawn, and I am especially thrown off when
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she suggests that Jonathan Edwards is a pragmatist
of a kind (77). I’ve read a lot of Edwards and know
him to be many things, but I’ve never considered
him a pragmatist.
The reason I find Robinson’s support of
pragmatism so curious is because of what I
mentioned above about her encouragement of
the traditional arts and sciences generally, and
the humanities specifically.4 Robinson argues that
in order to understand the deepest part of being
human, if that is even possible, “we must encourage
the study of the aptly named humanities” (119).
Likewise, she is critical of colleges and universities
because they “now seem obsessed with marketing
themselves and ensuring the marketability of their
product, which will make the institution itself
more marketable—a loop of mutual reinforcement
of the kind that sets in when thinking becomes
pathologically narrow” (123). It is pragmatism,
at least as I think of the philosophy, that causes
us to focus mainly on economic aspect—James’
own metaphor is the “cash value” of an idea—thus
“ransacking our public school system, [while] we
have been turning a coldly utilitarian eye on our
great universities” (114). I agree wholeheartedly
with Robinson that the way forward is to encourage
the humanities in academic institutions, because
they “teach us respect for what we are—we, in
the largest sense. Or they should, because there
is another reality, greater than the markets, and
that is the reality in which the planet is fragile,
and peace among nations, where it exists, is also
fragile” (123). Amen.
A second important theme in these essays is the
cultural importance and influence of Calvinism,
which helps shape her thought and writing, giving
much of it a theological tenor. Calvinism, for
Robinson, is important as a metaphysics because it
allows one to weather various scientific discoveries,
particularly in physics, that force us to rethink
reality as we know it (87-88, 145, 171). According
to her, much religious thought (literalism and
liberalism) and parascience is rooted in outdated
modes of knowing, particularly positivism, and
thus they lack the framework to wrestle with these
discoveries in helpful ways.
Robinson’s Calvinism is unconventional, even
if theologically conservative (for examples, see 73,
89, 142, 170, 188, 209, 212, 243). It transcends
typical Calvinist categories, whether doctrinalism,

pietism, transformationalism, or any mix of the
three. What I find interesting is her ability to see
Calvinism’s pervasive influence in various historical
eras, even among those that do not seem to
evidence that influence (61). For example, she finds
Calvinist influence in Shakespeare and Elizabethan
England as a whole (50, 62-63, 65-66), as well as
in nineteenth-century American thought, such as
Lincoln’s use of Calvinist categories regarding the
acceptance of suffering with humility (100-101)
and in Emily Dickinson’s poetry (145). Robinson
finds Calvinist influence in more traditional places,
like Jonathan Edwards (87-88) and the Puritans
(60). She also considers Calvinism’s influence in
Reformation Era England, particularly in terms
of the dignity of the working class it encouraged,
in the move from Latin to vernacular connected
with the beauty and poetics of English as a written
language, and in the English Renaissance (19-27,
53-55, 60-61).
Perhaps my favorite item in The Givenness
of Things is a new, or renewed, strain of her
thought in the return to Shakespeare, the subject
of her doctoral research. I particularly enjoy her
theological reading of Shakespeare, and not
simply because her readings transcend the endless
debate as to whether Shakespeare was a Protestant
or a Catholic. Perhaps because I read and enjoy
Shakespeare for pleasure only and because he is
not a subject of scholarly study for me, I find her
theological readings so compelling. She argues that
in some sense Shakespeare transcends categories
of orthodoxy and heresy (or of Protestant and
Catholic) and instead wrestles with much deeper
and grander human questions (35, 65), such as The
Tempest, which “takes us as far into the thinnest
upper atmosphere as anything I know, whether
art, metaphysics, or theology” (222).
She considers Shakespeare’s wrestling with evil,
forgiveness, and grace in various plays, asking,
“How is life to be lived in this fallen world, with
all its dangers and temptations, if grace is taken to
be the standard of a virtuous life?” (33) Robinson
goes on to write, “I propose that, in his later
plays, Shakespeare gives grace a scale and aesthetic
power, and a structural importance, that reach
toward a greater sufficiency of expression—not
a definition or a demonstration of grace or even
an objective correlative for it, but the intimation
of a great reality of another order, which pervades

human experience, even manifests itself in human
actions and relations, yet is always purely itself ”
(34). Plays as diverse as Cymbeline, Antony and
Cleopatra, Measure for Measure, The Winter’s
Tale, and The Tempest receive mention because
“reconciliation is their subject” and that “[t]hey are
about forgiveness that is unmerited, unexpected,
unasked, unconditional. In other words, they are
about grace” (39). That said, Robinson focuses
most of her creative and interpretive energy on
Hamlet (40-45) and Antony and Cleopatra (45-49).
Not content to deal simply with reconciliation,
she also considers scenes of recognition that
precede those of reconciliation, as Robinson
writes, “[a]gain and again they tell us really to see
the people we thought we knew, and really to feel
the sanctity of the bonds we think we cherish. They
open onto the inarticulable richness concealed
in the garments of the ordinary—in the manner
of Christianity, properly understood” (223).
Ultimately, she argues, to read Shakespeare is to
participate in metaphysics. Or in theology (224).
There is so much more I could say. I should
have mentioned her essay on fear as a driving force
in contemporary America, which is in many ways
prophetic of Donald Trump’s dramatic political
rise. I find fascinating the ease with which she
transcends typical religious categories (e.g., liberal
vs. conservative). In this review I have said nothing
regarding her civic mindedness and engagement,
her scriptural interpretation, or her thoughts on
Bonhoeffer and Barth. I implore you to take up and
read and reread The Givenness of Things to discover
much more. But if you have not read Robinson
before, this is not the place to start; begin instead
with her fiction. Then move to her nonfiction, and
even so, I prefer the tight coherence of Absence of
Mind or the essays in The Death of Adam to this
present volume, and especially the more subdued
argumentation in her previous nonfiction to the
more forceful tone of The Givenness of Things.
Endnotes
1. For that article, see: http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/2015/11/05/president-obamamarilynne-robinson-conversation/
2. Marilynne Robinson, Absence of Mind: The
Dispelling of Inwardness from the Modern Myth
of the Self (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2010), 32-33, 43.
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3. See also, for example, her guest appearance
with astrophysicist Marcelo Gleiser on the
radio show On Being, “The Mystery We Are,”
January 2, 2014. The transcript can be found at
http://www.onbeing.org/program.

4. See, for example, her 2015 Presidential Lecture
in the Arts and Humanities at Stanford: http://
news.stanford.edu/news/2015/november/
robinson-humanities-lecture-110315.html

The Political World of Bob Dylan: Freedom and Justice, Power and Sin. Taylor, Jeff, and Chad Israelson,
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 304pp. ISBN: 978-1137482341. Reviewed by Dave Schelhaas,
Professor Emeritus of English, Dordt College.
For anyone who is a lifelong Dylanophile—
and they are legion—this book is a treasure
trove. It teems with historical material about the
iconic artist’s life and career, with piquant Dylan
quotations drawn from countless interviews,
with analyses of lyrics (though, sadly, lyrics are
not quoted in the book—probably because
of copyright prohibitions) and analyses of his
relationship with the Jesus people in the 1970s
who were instrumental in his conversion. It
establishes that from the time of his conversion
Dylan has remained a believer in Jesus Christ.
Most importantly, it integrates all of this data to
defend a thesis concerning Dylan’s political and
spiritual beliefs. The Political World of Bob Dylan
explores Dylan’s relationship to many ideologies
and movements, but at its core is the contention
and the attempt to show that after his conversion
Dylan became a Christian anarchist.
Chad Israelson, author of the first three
chapters, writes about Dylan’s early years in
Hibbing, Minnesota, living on the iron range
where it was more of a stigma to be rich than poor.
Here Dylan—then Robert Zimmerman—learned
of the ravages caused by economic downturns.
Here he developed from his Jewish tradition a
sense of the sacred. Here he came to appreciate
spirituality and recognize that Christianity and the
Jewish faith were inextricably linked. But here he
also learned that the demand for conformity was
powerful in his small, tightly-knit community, and
that he would have to leave it and “keep running”
to fulfill his dreams.
In Chapter 2, “Voice of a Generation,” Israelson
traces Dylan’s life from his early fame in the 1960s
until the present. He shows how his music fits
with some of the ideas of the New Left, the Peace
Movement, and the Civil Rights Movement, and
then he moves on to show Dylan’s continuing
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influence and experiences up to the present.
Early in Chapter 3, Israelson writes that
“over a span of a career from the early 1960s into
the twenty-first century Dylan has called into
question all power structures be they political,
legal, economic or social” (94). He then goes on
to illustrate this point by examining more than
twenty of Dylan’s songs that deal with freedom
and justice. Analyses of “The Lonesome Death
of Hattie Carroll” and “Only a Pawn in Their
Game” (about the shooting of Medgar Evers) are
especially effective in showing Dylan’s nuanced
understanding of evil. Dylan does not blame the
deaths of Carroll and Evers simply on the evil men
who killed them but on “a system of institutional
racism that pitted poor whites against Blacks” and
the “absence of legal equality” (99). Here, perhaps,
we see the beginnings of Dylan as anarchist.
What, you may ask, is a Christian anarchist?
The word anarchy usually means a “state of
lawlessness or political disorder brought about
by the absence of government” and is often
associated with people who go around blowing up
government buildings. This is not the meaning of
“Christian anarchist.”
According to Jeff Taylor, the primary author of
the last four chapters, “when used in its political,
non-pejorative sense, anarchy refers to the absence
of political authority,” and “anarchists are persons
who advocate the elimination of government”
but without violence. People who embrace this
philosophy for “Christian” reasons are Christian
anarchists. Examples of Christian anarchists given
by Taylor are Leo Tolstoy and Albert Schweitzer.
Using H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and
Culture with its five responses to culture, Taylor
places Christian anarchism in the “Christ Against
Culture” category. He notes that even before
he became a Christian, Dylan, with his protest

